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Abstract As a contribution to the burgeoning field of health humanities, this paper seeks to
explore the power of dance to mitigate human suffering and reacquaint us with what it means
to be human through bringing the embodied practice of dance into dialogue with the work of
the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of subjec-
tivity as embodied and of intersubjectivity as intercorporeality frees us from many of the
constraints of Cartesian thinking and opens up a new way of thinking about how dance
functions as a healing art through its ability to ground and reconnect us with self, world, and
others–with our humanity. It is argued that through a Merleau-Pontian framework, we can
come to appreciate the true potential of dance as a positive and deeply humanising experience,
demonstrating how expressive arts practice understood through the lens of philosophical
theory can open up new dimensions of understanding and experience in relation to well-
being and self- (and other-) care.
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Introduction
Dance plays a role in healing rituals across a number of cultures and is also recognised to
promote social bonding (Chaiklin 2009). Indeed even in contemporary Western medicine,
dance is used in psychotherapeutic contexts in the form of dance/movement therapy (DMT).
As a contribution to the burgeoning field of health humanities, this paper seeks to explore the
power of dance to mitigate human suffering and reacquaint us with what it means to be human
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The promise of the health humanities – and we should note here that the medical/health
humanities should not be thought of as a discipline but rather as a multidisciplinary, interdis-
ciplinary or perhaps even post-disciplinary field of study (Atkinson et al. 2015) – is of a
broader and richer understanding of what is healthful and therapeutic through exploration of
and insight into the human condition. As such, it celebrates the uses of arts and humanities
within traditional healthcare settings, practices and training and calls for a reimaging of the
boundaries of health and healing, so that our intellectual and therapeutic focus might escape
the physical and, perhaps more importantly, the epistemological constraints of the clinical
(Crawford et al. 2010; Crawford et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2014). In this spirit, this article
presents an alternative understanding of dance as therapeutic, which is based in philosophy
rather than in the psy-disciplines or the neuroscientific insights that currently dominate the
literature of DMT as a clinical practice.
Of particular significance for an alternative framing of dance is Merleau-Ponty’s concep-
tualisation of human being – as embodied subjectivity or the ‘body-subject’ - in a way that
transcends the traditional Cartesian dualist distinctions between mind and body and between
subject and object (see Purser 2011). While DMT is clearly a bodily/physical practice used in a
mental health or psychotherapeutic intervention, the psy- (and sci-) disciplines which currently
underpin expressive arts therapy tend to remain locked in a Cartesian framework which
struggles to fully integrate our bodily exterior with our psychic interior. The focus on the
content of artistic expression as a route to the unconscious and on the co-production of art or
movement as a route to a therapeutic relationship means that creative practice is conceptualised
as a way to facilitate verbal dialogue, as the true medium of therapy (Skaife 2001).
In contrast to this, Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist philosophy, in its illumination of the bodily
basis of being, allows us to make sense of the embodied creative practice of dance as
therapeutic in its own right. Thus, in line with David Pilgrim’s recent reflections on the
philosophical aspirations of the medical humanities, not only does this approach ‘create an
opportunity to provide a richer epistemology,’ but it also allows for a ‘more sensitive approach
to ontology than medical positivism’ (2016, 442). In locating subjectivity in the lived body,
Merleau-Ponty locates our capacities for thinking and feeling in a sensual and sensuous body
which is embedded in and oriented towards the world around us and the others in our
environment. Contra Descartes, there is no separate realm of the mental in which thinking
occurs; only embodied beings making sense of the world they inhabit. Our thoughts are
manifest through the body, be it in language or gesture, and in the world, be they silent,
vocalised or expressed through the creative arts (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 1964b).
Importantly for Merleau-Ponty, our thoughts come into being in a world which, as
embodied beings, we are directly part of and also share with others. We are thus presented
with an understanding of human being which orients us towards thinking in terms of a shared
world where thoughts come into being through bodily expression and where intersubjective
relations have to be understood as taking place between situated embodied beings. In focussing
on this shared world and on the corporeal dimensions of intersubjectivity – intersubjectivity as
intercorporeality –Merleau-Ponty frees us from many of the constraints of Cartesian thinking
and opens up a new way of thinking about how dance functions as a healing art through its
ability to ground and reconnect us with self, world, and others—with our humanity.
This paper will proceed by elaborating the concept of intercorporeality through a detailed
explication of Merleau-Ponty’s thought before exploring how this plays out in the embodied
practice of dance. In order to attend to the experience and the potential of dance, this study
draws on in-depth qualitative interview accounts of sixteen professional contemporary dancers
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from United Kingdom (UK) repertory companies. In keeping with the aims of health human-
ities to broaden our understanding of the healthful dimensions of the arts and to democratise
our approach to the arts in health- (and self-) care beyond the clinical setting, this is not,
therefore a study of DMT therapists and patients; rather it is a study of individuals for whom
dance forms a central part of their lives. Professional dancers, in particular, were chosen for
this study because their daily engagement with dance as reflexive practitioners gives them a
heightened awareness of their own embodiment and that of others.
Theoretical underpinnings
For Merleau-Ponty the primary sense of self is not understood in the Cartesian dualist sense
which conceptualises human subjectivity in terms of res cogitans (thinking substance) while
rendering the body mere res extensia (extended or physical substance). Rather, prior to
Descartes’ cogito – ‘I think therefore I am’ – there is the ‘tacit cogito’ – ‘I can’ – the feel
we have of our body and how it connects us to the world. Merleau-Ponty (2002) also denotes
this pre-reflective feel that we have for our body’s positioning and possibilities for action with
the term, corporeal schema. My corporeal schema is thus my primary sense of self or ‘I’ in the
sense of the ‘I can.’
While the Cartesian tradition has struggled with the problem of intersubjectivity, also
known as the problem of ‘other minds,’ Merleau-Ponty’s rethinking of self as situated and
embodied opens up the possibility for rethinking self-other relations. Descartes’ cogito sets up
both what it is to be a conscious subject and what it is to know a conscious subject so that the
only way to know a conscious subject is to be that conscious subject reflecting on itself: ‘I
think therefore I am.’ Thus where human being is defined, as per Descartes, as res cogitans, I
can only have access to myself and can never be sure of the existence of other human beings.
This situation of solipsism – the isolation of the subject from others – is arguably intrinsic to
and insoluble within Cartesian thought.
In contrast to this, Merleau-Ponty shifts the focus from the private, invisible experience of
thought to the lived body through his redefinition of human being in terms of embodiment and
behaviour, these being visible and publicly available. If self or subjectivity is not non-material
consciousness but is rather manifest in my animate embodiment, then we do not have
transparent access to self through introspection as Descartes suggests but rather achieve self-
knowledge through action. The Cartesian problem of solipsism is thus dissolved in Merleau-
Ponty’s framework as my existence as a self comes into being and comes to my awareness in
the same shared world where other selves are coming into being and to my awareness. I do not
have complete, transparent access to myself, but neither is my knowledge and surety confined
to an inner realm of consciousness: if to be human is to be a human body and exhibit human
behaviour then, as Dillon suggests in his book Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, ‘I can see your
humanity and you can see mine’ (1997, 113).
Intersubjectivity, for Merleau-Ponty, is therefore based in a mutual awareness, which is
understood as a reciprocity of perception. This reciprocity is encapsulated in the concept of
reversibility which becomes a motif throughout Merleau-Ponty’s writings being most fully
explored in his later work including his last published essay Eye and Mind (1964a), which
focuses on visual art and the embodiment of the painter in the world and his incomplete final
work The Visible and the Invisible (1969). Reversibility is primarily conceptualised through
the basic model of one of my hands touching the other where the hand that touches can also be
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touched by the hand that was originally touched but is now touching. Indeed being able to
touch anything requires that the toucher is also touchable, as to touch a thing is to feel the thing
touching me.
This perspective dissolves any clear distinction between touching and touched, sentient and
sensible, and thus between the body as subject and the body as object. I experience my body as
neither wholly Cartesian subject – in which case it would be invisible – nor as wholly object –
in which case it would not be able to serve my intentions. Indeed object manipulation requires
that I both see my hand in relation to the object I wish to grasp and that this wish or intention to
grasp is lived through my hand (Merleau-Ponty 1964c). Thus I understand and inhabit my
body as simultaneously part of my intentional subjectivity and as an object in the world – an
awareness that Merleau-Ponty calls corporeal reflexivity. This corporeal reflexivity allows that
there is overlap, not only between my body as subject and my body as object but also between
my experience of my (visible and touchable) body and my experience of other bodies,
explaining the possibility of imitating the behaviour of the Other despite the fact that the outer
look of the behaviour is not the same as the inner feel of the behaviour. As Dillon explains:
My body is the ground of my identity for myself, hence it can function as the ground of
my identity for others, and your body plays the same role for you, me, and the others
who dwell in our world. Furthermore, the isomorphism of our bodies provides a basis
for mutual understanding: I understand the behaviour of your hands as I see them from
the outside because my hands are similar to yours and I know them from the inside.
(1997, 113-114)
Thus there is a reversibility to intersubjective relations which relies on my own sensibility as
well as my sentience: the Other and I are mutually available to each other through our
perception of each other. The corporeal schema—my primary, embodied sense of self— is
not a private, inner realm but rather is visibly and tangibly manifest in my embodied
behaviour, and as embodied, sentient and sensible beings open to a shared world, we
experience each other in what Merleau-Ponty terms carnal intersubjectivity or
intercorporeality. This intercorporeal connection with the Other is referred to as transfer of
corporeal schema, and it is through this process that we recognise other human beings as like
ourselves, making it the grounds of intersubjectivity.
Approach/methods
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy emphasises the importance of a tacit or pre-reflective sense of
self which precedes or underlies the reflective thought involved in the Cartesian cogito.
Understanding our subjectivity and what it is to be human, thus requires attending to our
pre-reflective sense of ourselves as embodied beings in the world. Direct experiences of
dance are particularly helpful for this because as an embodied practice and an expressive
art, engaging in dance focuses us on our bodily presence in the world and on the here-and-
now rather than encouraging detached reflection. As Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1981)
describes, dancing involves a thinking in movement rather than a thinking about movement;
body and intentional being are one. Thus in dance we develop our awareness of what
Merleau-Ponty refers to as the corporeal schema, our immediate tacit sense of embodied
self, which dancers in this study described with the terms ‘being-in-your-body’ and ‘being-
in-the-moment.’
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The importance of focusing on the present moment or the here-and-now has already been
identified as significant for psychotherapeutic progress because of its ability to facilitate the
therapeutic relationship both in individual psychotherapy and in group therapy (Yalom 1985),
and expressive arts therapies including DMT have been recognised as useful because of their
ability to produce this focus (Erfer and Ziv 2006). The following discussion of dance,
however, departs from the understanding of art practice as a tool for producing material for
a psychotherapy session or for facilitating the building of the therapeutic relationship. Rather,
in seeking to understand throughMerleau-Ponty what it is that occurs when we dance together,
this paper makes a case for a philosophically informed position which sees dance not simply as
a means to a therapeutic end but as an end in itself in terms of its ability to meaningfully and
directly (re-)engage us with self, others and our environment—to bring us back to our
humanity. As such it is in tune with the aim of the medical health humanities not to make
sense of the arts from within the framework of the biomedical world-view but to ‘refocus the
whole of medicine in relation to an understanding of what it is to be fully human’ (Greaves and
Evans 2000, 1).
The data drawn on in this section comes from a qualitative interview study which explored
the experience of dance and being a dancer. Dancers were recruited to the study through their
places of work, and the data presented in this paper is from a convenience sample of sixteen
professional dancers at two separate repertory companies in the United Kingdom. Ethical
clearance was sought from the University of Nottingham prior to any contact with participants,
and full informed consent procedures were implemented with each participant before inter-
views began.
During the interviews I asked each interviewee the broad question of what it was like to
dance with someone in the context of conversation about fairly mundane aspects of dance,
revolving around issues like learning new material and questions about the practice and
process of dance such as how they knew what to do next and how they knew when they
had learnt a choreography. Such questions were intended to tap into dancers’ reflections on the
pre-reflective or taken-for-granted aspects of their embodied practice and to encourage further
reflection on any areas that their previous training and practice had not already led them to
reflect on. This mundane focus on practice was also a key and productive part of the
conversations about dancing with others where dancers were able to talk about tacit and pre-
reflective aspects of intersubjective negotiation and understanding. This topic was, however,
also the one which produced the most lengthy and poetic responses from my interviewees, as
can be seen in some of the quotations below, where dancers brought in new dimensions such
as talk of the soul and intimacy that did not arise in answers to my other questions.
The following discussion uses a Merleau-Pontian framework to make sense of the mundane
and physical aspects of dancing together and also the spiritual or transcendent aspects of the
experience, not as separate dimensions but as inherently linked. It is only through an under-
standing of our fundamental groundedness in our bodies that we can fully understand the
moments of interpersonal synchrony, connection, intimacy and understanding that are central to
our experience of intersubjectivity and are so beautifully illustrated in the practice of dance.
The experience of dancing with others
The process of joint movement, of dancing with someone else, is particularly interesting for
rethinking intersubjectivity in Merleau-Pontian terms as it involves a form of connection or
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communication which is achieved without words and through the medium of bodily contact.
As Louisa suggests, openness to such bodily communication is part of an overall tacit or pre-
reflective awareness that the dancer has of her embodiment and situation within the immediate
context of the dance:
If you’re in the moment and you’re on stage and you’re aware – you’re in the moment
and you’re in your body, you’re in that part of the piece, but you also have to be super-
aware in the way that you’re ready to accept anything, and that’s like that communica-
tion that happens which is not, you don’t talk you just know, you, you even feel it in, you
feel inside and you just react – that’s the strange thing and that’s really exciting when
you just have that, when it’s in sync like that. [Louisa]
Here the dancers are not consciously formulating thoughts or reflecting on the situation but are
reacting to each other – to each other’s bodies – at a pre-reflective level. Louisa describes the
direct response she experiences to the Other’s movement as the two dancers being ‘in sync’
and emphasises that she knows or feels how to move with or respond to the Other with an
immediacy which does not involve discussing or reflecting on the process.
Thus dance grounds us in our own body-subjectivity or bodily intentionality and also
orients us to or opens us towards the body-subjectivity or bodily intentionality of the other
dancer. The analogy with conversation used by many of the dancers is significant because this
notion of a (tacit or unspoken) dialogical interaction emphasises a two-way process between
two mutually engaged beings. Dancing together thus involves a reciprocal openness or
awareness allowing this type of tacit bodily communication to occur:
There’s this like different kind of awareness that you have to have, just because you have
to be able to move together, in a small space, and big space, so em, you definitely have to
have that self-awareness and knowing kind of, kind of not just being taking care of
yourself but I think what is the nicest part as well when you do get to dance actually with
someone,… you have to talk with your bodies so you have to kind of listen to each other –
you can’t always do it your way, you have to find the way. [Anna]
The awareness of and connection with other dancers achieved in this way is not just therefore,
limited to understanding the materiality of their bodies in terms of weight and position in space
but also includes an understanding of them as intentional beings who want to do things in
certain ways that may be different to what you want. The dancers are able to recognise each
other through their bodily interaction as other physical objects in the world and as other body-
subjects, and it is this capacity which allows for the claim that dance enhances our connection
with our embodied selves but also with the Other as Other. The dancer does not simply
subsume the presence of the Other into her own perspective on the world but is drawn out of
herself to recognise the Other’s situation and intentions and experience genuine communica-
tion and expressive collaboration.
Tara again here makes reference to the notion of talking and listening through the body
when working with a new partner:
You can tell a lot without, even just working closely with them, just from the look or the
way they, their body works with yours, and how they, you can kind of listen to each other
through your bodies. You can become quite close to people – you have to be prepared to
work very closely with people physically, but because you’re so close physically you, it
opens up something mentally as well, there’s some connection there. [Tara]
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Tara’s comments about the link between physical closeness and mental closeness can be
understood in terms of the Merleau-Pontian notion of transfer of corporeal schema where
we can come to know people’s thoughts, feelings and intentions through identifying with
them at the level of the corporeal schema. It is through this pre-reflective intercorporeal
identification that I can immediately sense, for example, sadness or anger in the Other, but
this facility is heightened and extended in the case of dancers who work closely with each
other over time and whose interpersonal connections are formed in the context of joint
artistic expression.
Dancers primarily learn dance through processes of imitation, mirroring or copying others’
movements, which can be understood as involving intercorporeal overlap between how the
dancer experiences his or her own body and how the dancer experiences the body of the person
demonstrating the movement. In addition to this, much new choreography is developed
through processes of contact improvisation where the dancers spontaneously move together
allowing patterns of movement to emerge from their mutual contact rather than being
conceptualised beforehand. Dance training and its creative practice therefore open us up to
the reversibility inherent in intercorporeal relations, and Tara’s comments suggest that the
intercorporeal identification involved in learning dance also makes the dancer more open to
those dimensions of the Other’s existence that she describes as mental.
Intercorporeality and transfer of corporeal schema is thus enhanced in dance, allowing
dancers to come to understand other dancers physically in terms of how they move and to
develop a sense of closeness, connection or communion at a human, mental or emotional level
when dancing with someone. Through moving with each other and attending to the corporeal
schema of the other dancer, dancers can come to understand and experience a kind of physical
and emotional or mental synchrony, a kinaesthetic empathy, with the dancer with whom they
are moving. Dancing with another person thus returns us to a recognition of our shared
humanity and our capacity for mutual openness and connection.
Indeed my interviewees emphasised that dance is characterised by mutual openness in the
sense of both awareness and honesty:
You do get to know somebody then because you get to see em, – it’s really difficult to
explain, but you get to see them for who they are, you know because people have a lot of
barriers and a lot of masks upon themselves a lot of the time and if you’re really invested
into the moment and invested in this connection then you have to let those masks and
those barriers fall down so that you can feel one another, be with one another and
experience this thing with one another and I mean, when it gets to that point you know
that person whether they’re feeling sad or whether they’re feeling happy and they don’t
even have to even say anything so you know, you have a sense of how they are that day
and you take that into account - there’s not a judgement on that it’s just this is how the
person is today, this is how I am today and this what it is today and that’s why it’s
beautiful. [Steven]
This is not to say that dancers do not communicate with each other verbally. There was,
however, a clear suggestion from all my interviewees that being physically close, ‘in tune,’ or
synchronised with another dancer allowed some access to the thoughts and feelings of the
Other without anything being reflected on or said. For Merleau-Ponty it is this direct openness
to others and to a shared world which characterises intercorporeality, and in the above quote
Steven emphasises that the expressive qualities of the two dancers are absorbed into the dance
on a particular day without anyone reflecting on or judging the quality of the Other’s
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movement. The process of creative collaboration thus allows the dancers to experience their
own and their partner’s mood as jointly expressed in the co-created movement of dancing
together.
Steven describes this, somewhat hesitantly, then, as an interconnection or communion of
the two dancers’ souls as well as their bodies which he likens to intimacy of the experience of
making love:
I think that you get to know people incredibly well through dancing – incredibly,
incredibly well in a way which is really quite beautiful actually, really quite beautiful
because it, because, because it, because of the context of it, it allows space for you to – I
don’t want to sound really cheesy here – but almost for like your, when it, for your souls
to interconnect in many senses because there isn’t the em, sexuality or ego or all these
other kind of things placed on top of it, it’s just simply about being with someone in the
space and connecting with someone and that is such a beautiful sensation. I mean, I’ve
chatted to my friends who are not dancers about this and I think the only way that I often
explain to them about how wonderful it is to dance and so on is like imagine, making
love to someone but you’re not – d’you know what I mean? – that totally doesn’t make no
sense – You’re as intimate with, you’re as connected with that person, you know, and
obviously it doesn’t always get to that level but when it does that’s when not only do you
feel it but the audience feels it as well – it gets to a place where you’re communicating,
you’re operating on a level of sensation and connection and it’s almost like you’re,
you’re having a conversation of sensation but there’s no attachments or connotations of
anything else really – it’s really quite beautiful, really something quite special.[Steven]
The comparison he makes with sexual intimacy is interesting, not only because shared
sexual or orgasmic experience has been suggested above as one of the most recognisable
examples in adult life of a sense of communion or synchrony through transfer of corporeal
schema but also because Steven further qualifies his use of this example. Steven in fact
suggests that dance is an even better example of this kind of interconnection than sex because
he associates sex with notions of egoism and sexuality, which I take to mean that there are
more issues around one person having and showing off his power over the Other in sex. In
contrast, dance, for Steven, ideally seems to allow for intimacy without these power relations
and thus something more akin to communion of the souls. This is unlikely to be true of all
sexual encounters and all dancing encounters, but the context of dance as creative collabora-
tion opens up the possibility for us to transcend our individual ego-centric concerns and feel
that we are genuinely in touch with the Other in a direct and open process of co-creation and
co-expression. It was this ability to come out of oneself and experience mutual connection with
the Other which my interviewees talked about as making the experience of dancing with
someone else particularly ‘special’ or ‘beautiful.’
In Steven’s words, dance as an expressive art form ‘allows space’ for this type of experience
in a way that we do not find in other facets of life. It is not the case, however, that a connection
or intimacy of this kind is always established between dancers working together. Anna, for
example, mentioned that there were certain dancers in companies with whom she had felt
uncomfortable while Carrie, again using conversation as an analogy for dancing with some-
one, commented of forming a connection with another dancer that:
You just naturally gel with another person like you would, you know, having coffee,
sometimes you do, sometimes you don’t. [Carrie]
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It also appeared that this type of intimacy or syncretism between dancers was more usually
established in a company where the dancers worked together closely over long periods of time.
Rhianna describes this process as the ongoing negotiation of an unspoken relationship between
dancers where:
After you work with someone for a while you get to like, you feel their body, you feel like
where they’re going to take your, you just, you know if you’re working on a duet together
you just develop that understanding of how much a risk you can take within that and
each other. [Rhianna]
She further describes this relationship as something that is developed through working
physically closely together:
As you start to like get comfortable with it and start to explore the connection, you
develop your own story I think without speaking to each other – you know, you don’t say
Boh when I’m dancing with you I feel like you’re this and this that and the other^ – you
just sort of, you don’t even know yourself exactly what, necessarily what the relationship
is between you but you do definitely develop something that’s like both of you understand
physically but don’t necessarily put into words – I think it’s quite special. [Rhianna]
In a continuation of the passage quoted above, Steven further explains:
You do get to know a lot about people when you dance with them because you’re working
with them all the time and you sweat – you sweat with one another for goodness sake –
you know when you sweat with someone you get to know everything about them… it kind
of is so, such a close-knit thing and you have to be so co-dependent, you know, it’s so, you
know, it’s impossible for you not to get to know someone really well. [Steven]
Here, again, Steven’s account of dancing with someone emphasises notions of mutual
openness, and both Rhianna and Steven evoke a sense of vulnerability in their use of terms
such as risk and dependency. What is special about the relationship formed when we dance
with another person is therefore that it develops in us a capacity for openness towards the
Other which may feel too dangerous in alternative situations where it doesn’t arise pre-
reflectively from mutual trust being slowly built up in the process of joint movement. It
provides a context in which mutual openness (and its attendant vulnerability) develops
between embodied beings, returning us to an understanding of our basic potential to connect
with the Other and the world and thus with our own humanity.
Conclusion: dance, health and humanity
In a world where negative feelings of detachment, fracture and alienation have consistently
been identified by psycho-social theorists as ‘symptoms’ of modern living, it becomes
increasingly important that any understanding of health engages with issues of groundedness
and connectedness. In the spirit of the health humanities, this paper has offered the philosophy
of Merleau-Ponty as a basis from which we might begin to make sense of our being-in-the-
world as body-subjectivity and also of our connection to others as embodied and as borne of
our mutual situatedness in a shared world, thus opening up a different kind of conversation
about the therapeutic value of dance from those generally found in the psy- and sci-informed
disciplines with their Cartesian underpinnings.
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Importantly, it is dance as an end in itself that is brought centre-stage in this discussion, and
the focus on the experiences of those who engage in dance as creative practice rather than
those who subsume dance into their broader (psycho-) therapeutic practice is significant for re-
adjusting the way we think about dance (and all creative arts) as healing and life-enhancing.
This move out of the clinical setting is also significant in the context of the aims of the health
humanities to democratise the practice of healing arts beyond professions such as DMT and to
extend their reach beyond patient populations.
As has been shown in the discussion above, dance stimulates a particular kind of awareness
that not only helps us to experience ourselves in a more holistic way as embodied beings by
grounding us ‘in the moment’ and ‘in your body’ but also opens us to a direct connection with
the embodied Other. Here, dance allows us to experience a form of communication or dialogue
with the Other characterised by a mutual openness and a transcendent state where self and other
are both drawn out of themselves into the ongoing communicative and creative experience of
co-expression. Through this Merleau-Pontian framework we can come to appreciate the true
potential of dance as a positive and deeply humanising experience, thus demonstrating how
expressive arts practice understood through the lens of philosophical theory can open up new
dimensions of understanding and experience in relation towell-being and self- (and other-) care.
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